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Appendix A. Details for the introduction 2 A.1. Calculations for comparing the pollution from congestion to that saved by the current fleet of hybrid and electric vehicles 2 A.2. Detail on other barriers to implementing congestion pricing 2 Appendix B. Details for Section 3 2 B.1. Mapping between arrival and departure times 2 Appendix C. Details for Section 4 3 C.1. Equilibrium when the road is completely free or priced 3 C. Appendix A. Details for the introduction A.1. Calculations for comparing the pollution from congestion to that saved by the current fleet of hybrid and electric vehicles. The Environmental Protection Agency (2011) estimates that the typical passenger vehicle emits 5.1 metric tons of carbon dioxide a year, so the additional pollution is equivalent to that of 5.5 million vehicles. Samaras and Meisterling (2008) estimate that a plug-in hybrid reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 32% compared to conventional vehicles while traditional hybrids reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 29%. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013 , Table 58) estimates that by the end of 2013 there will be 2.73 million hybrid and electric cars and trucks, of which 98.7% are traditional hybrids. While Samaras and Meisterling (2008) estimate the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over the vehicle lifetime, so these numbers are not perfectly comparable, these numbers imply the current fleet of electric and hybrid cars is equivalent to removing 0.8 million conventional vehicles from the road. Dividing 5 million by 0.8 million gives us the result that we need 6.88 times the current number of electric and hybrid vehicles to counteract the additional pollution due to congestion.
A.2. Detail on other barriers to implementing congestion pricing . Other barriers to implementing congestion pricing include the belief that it is unfair to let some pay with money to get faster travel times, concern that since tolling brings in more revenue for the government it will lead to increased government spending, and worry that it will hurt downtown retail. For an example of the first belief see Malady, Matthew. 2013 . "Want to Save Civilization? Get in Line," New York Times, May 31, 2013. When drivers in Southern California were asked why they oppose congestion pricing, in the specific form of allowing solo drivers to pay to travel in carpool only lanes, 40% responded that either the government will waste the money or it will increase government bureaucracy (Fall 1999 Commuter Survey from Sullivan (1999) ). For evidence on the downtown retail store's opposition to congestion pricing see De Borger and Russo (2017) .
Appendix B. Details for Section 3 B.1. Mapping between arrival and departure times. This appendix contains additional details on the mapping between arrival times and departure times, and when it is safe to do so. If we were instead to define travel times in terms of when an agent departs, we would say travel time along route r for an agent departing at t is where T f is the fixed travel time, and is still assumed to be zero, and T v d,r (t) is variable travel time for route r. Variable travel time is only due to queuing and is the length of the queue divided by the rate at which cars leave the queue
If an agent departs at t d then he will arrive at t = t d + T d (t d ), and so f (t d ) = t d + T d (t d ) is the function that maps between departure and arrival times. As long as dT d /dt d = −1 then f will be bijective and so invertible.
For dT d /dt d = −1 we would need there to be an interval where a queue exists but no agents depart. This will not happen in equilibrium in this model, though could with more general preferences. However, even were this to happen there is still a unique cost-minimizing departure time for each arrival time, as leaving at the end of the interval yields the same arrival time as leaving at any point within it, but with lower travel time.
Should the departure rate have a point mass there will not be a one-to-one mapping between departure times and arrival times. However, by assuming β i < α i for all i we rule this out.
Appendix C. Details for Section 4
In this section I solve for the equilibrium for the remaining cases not worked out in the main body of the paper. This includes one case when pricing all or none of the lanes and seven cases when value pricing. C.1. Equilibrium when the road is completely free or priced. First we work out additional details for the case when group B is inframarginal, and then we solve for the equilibrium when group B is marginal.
C.1.1. Additional details for when n B ≤ s. By solving (5), (6), and (7), or the equivalent equations for a priced route, we can determine the equilibrium travel time profile or toll schedule. These results give us (8), (9), (14), and (15). We can then solve forp I,r (B, t * ) as a function ofp I,r (A, t * ). Every agent in group B arrives exactly at their desired arrival time, and every agent in group A is willing to do so, though they will not in equilibrium. Because every agent in group A is willing to do so on a free routep Solving for total toll revenue yields (C.1)ˆt
C.1.2. When n B > s, and so group B is marginal. When n B > s there is no longer enough capacity for the inflexible agents to all arrive at their desired arrival time, and so they must arrive early or late. 1 Group B agents use all of the capacity near the peak, and group A agents use all of the capacity off-peak. Lemma 3 and the requirement that the travel time at the end of rush hour is zero define the equilibrium travel time profile as the solution to
1 Agents arriving early (late) are indifferent between arriving anytime between their desired arrival time and the earliest (latest) someone from their group arrives. Within a group of indifferent agents I choose their arrival times such that if an agent desires to arrive later than another agent, then he actually arrives later than the other agent. This choice means in this case only a set of measure zero agents arrive at their desired arrival time; it would be possible to re-arrange arrival times so that a greater share of group B agents arrived at their desired arrival times, but they would still be indifferent between being early or late, and it would have no effect on travel times, tolls, or trip costs.
The subscript M denotes that these objects belong to the case where all agents are marginal. Now we have three additional variables to solve for to find equilibrium travel times. As before, we use the requirement that supply equals demand for early and late arrivals, but now we do so for both groups. These requirements give us the following equations.
For the final equation I impose the definition of t max A ,
Equations (C.2)-(C.8) define a linear system of equations that gives us the equilibrium travel time profile.
As when n B ≤ s, the equations which define the equilibrium toll schedule are essentially the same as those that define the equilibrium travel time profile. By Lemma 4 and the requirement that the toll at the end of rush hour be zero we know
As before, we replace s with s * in (C.4)-(C.7) and change subscripts. Finally, we update the definition of t max A for a priced route by replacing "free" with "toll" in (C.8).
As in the previous case, we solve the applicable equations to determine the equilibrium travel time profile or toll schedule, and use those to find equilibrium trip costs. The agent with desired arrival time t max i for i ∈ {A, B} is indifferent between arriving at any time when other agents in his group are arriving.
2 As such, Using (C.11)-(C.15) and the solutions to the linear system of equations above, we can show that the equilibrium trip costs for the agents with desired arrival time t max i in each group i ∈ {A, B} on route r ∈ {free, toll} arē
We can also define the trip costs for all the other agents in reference to (C.16)-(C.18):
Notice that (C.16) is the same as (8) and (14), and that (C.19) matches (9) and (15). The equilibrium trip cost for an agent who is willing to arrive at the start or end of rush hour is pinned down by the length of rush hour. It does not matter whether the other group's agents are all able to arrive at their desired arrival time and it does not matter whether the road is priced or free, except indirectly through the effect of pricing on road capacity. Furthermore, the preferences of the group arriving at the peak do not affect the equilibrium trip costs of the group arriving off-peak.
Note that for (C.8) what matters is that the cost of arriving early equals the cost of arriving late for the agent in group A with desired arrival time t max A , so the exact times we evaluate this equation at don't matter as long as one is in [t 0A , t AB ] and the other is in [t BA , t A0 ] .
Solving for total toll revenue yields
C.2. Equilibrium when value pricing. Equilibrium can fall in one of eight cases depending on the parameters and I use subscripts to denote to which case equilibrium trip costs, travel times, and tolls belong. The three dimensions the cases differ on are (1) which group is not arriving off-peak (poor or rich), (2) whether some agents in this group are inframarginal or if they are all marginal (I or M), and (3) whether they are on one or two routes (1R or 2R). If an equilibrium objects does not depend on which group is not arriving off-peak, I omit that portion of the subscript. As we did when solving for equilibrium when the road is completely free or completely priced, define A as the group arriving off-peak, but now define B simply as the other group. Let C and D denote the preferred routes of groups A and B, that is
Using this notation we can write down four sets of equations that define equilibrium for all eight possible cases.
C.2.1. One group on just one route, and this group is inframarginal (1R, I). This case nests the one solved in the main body of the paper in Section 4.4.3. In this case group A travels on both routes and is always marginal while group B travels only on route D and is inframarginal. For this to be possible there must be enough capacity on D for all of the members of group B to arrive on-time, i.e., n B ≤ λ D s D .
Tolls and travel times are the same as when the entire road is free or priced and group B is inframarginal. The travel time profile is defined by (3), (4), and (7), and the toll schedule is defined by (11)-(13).
We then require that for group A the supply for arrival times equals the demand, both for early and late arrivals. This gives us the final two equations we need to define equilibrium.
Solving this system of equations gives us the equilibrium travel time profile and toll schedule. We can then follow the same steps as in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 to find the trip costs, which arē
C.2.2. One group on just one route, and all agents are marginal (1R, M). In this case group A is on both routes and group B is only on route D, and all agents are marginal. Because only one group travels on route C, its travel time profile or toll schedule is defined by the same equations as in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2: if C = free then the travel time profile is defined by (3), (4), and (7) while if C = toll then the toll schedule is defined by (11)-(13). Similarly, because both groups are on route D and are both marginal the travel time profile or toll schedule for route D is the same as in Section C.1.2: if D = free then the travel time profile is defined by (C.2) and (C.3), while if D = toll then the toll schedule is defined by (C.9) and (C.10). Given these equations for the travel time profile and toll schedule, we need to solve for six critical times t 0A , t A0 , t AB,D , t BA,D , t max A , t max B to fully specify the travel time profile and toll schedule and find equilibrium trip costs.
To solve for these six critical times we will set up a system of six linear equations. The first four will require that supply equals demand for both groups, for both early and late arrivals. Starting with group A agents who arrive early, note that they use all of the time before the peak on route C but only some of the time on route D, so
Group B agents who are early use only some of the time before the peak on route D, so
Late arrivals are similar and so,
For the final two equations we can either use the definitions of T max
Solving this system of equations gives us the equilibrium travel time profile and toll schedule, which we can use to find equilibrium trip costs. We know that an agent in group B with desired arrival time t max B will arrive at t max B and so can evaluate his trip cost at that point. Doing so yields C.25) 3 The four equations are not linearly independent. The information contained in either pair is the same.
These equilibrium trip costs are almost identical to (C.17) and (C.18). The primary difference is that (C.17) and (C.18) are a function of the mass of agents of group A traveling while these trip costs are a function of the mass of agents of group A who are traveling on route D. Similarly, we know that an agent in group A with desired arrival time t max A will arrive at t max A and so can evaluate his trip cost at that point. Doing so yields
Other than the difference in highway capacity (the denominator in the first fraction), (C.27) is the same as (C.21); in fact, the formula for the trip cost for the group that travels off-peak will be the same in every case because it is pinned down by when rush hour starts and ends. We can then define the trip cost for all other agents in reference to (C.25)-(C.27) using (C.19) with the appropriate updating of subscripts. The intuition and derivation of this is the same as in Section C.1.2. Now let's derive the conditions for when this case applies. In this case group A is on both routes and group B is only on route D, and all agents are marginal. This means there is not enough capacity on route D for group B agents to all arrive on-time, i.e., n B > λ D s D . It is also necessary that no agent in group B wants to deviate and travel on route C.
If group B would travel off-peak should they be on route C (i.e., β B /α B ≤ β A /α A and
) then they will not start traveling on route C until they are traveling at the start and end of rush hour on route D, that is, until they are using all of the capacity on route D during rush hour. The requirement that there be enough capacity on route D during rush hour for all group B agents can be written as
Because aggregate supply must equal aggregate demand and the start and end of rush hour are the same on both routes this is the same as
,
When group B travels at the peak on both routes (i.e., β B /α B ≥ β A /α A and β B ≥ β A ) then for them to not want to travel at the peak on route C we need the cost of doing so to exceed their equilibrium cost of traveling on route D. We will need to find the condition for this separately for when B = 1 and when B = 2. Let's start with when B = 1. Were a group 1 agent to deviate and travel on the free lane then by Lemma 1 he will arrive exactly on time. Thus we need
The final equality follows because each agent in group A is indifferent between arriving on-time on route C. In this case that means
and so we can summarize (C.28) as
By similar logic we can show that when B = 2 a group 2 agent will not want to deviate and travel on the priced lane as long as
C.2.3. Equilibrium when both groups are on both routes and some agents are inframarginal (2R, I). In this case both groups are on both routes, group B agents travel at the peak on both routes, and group A agents travel off-peak on both routes and at the peak on route C. What makes this case unique is that the group B agents who arrive on route C and some, but not all, of those who arrive on route D are indifferent between arriving on-time on either route, but are not indifferent between what time they arrive. Let's work through what equilibrium looks like when some poor agents are inframarginal. This will require that the poor are more inflexible than the rich and that β 2 > β 1 . Figure C .1 shows equilibrium travel times and tolls, as well as when each group arrives on each route, when this is the case. At the start of rush hour on both routes the rich agents arrive, they have flexible schedules and are willing to do so. The poor agents with desired arrival times near t s would rather be a little early and pay with travel time rather than arrive on-time but pay a toll, and start arriving at t 12 .
4 However, these agents cause travel times to climb relatively more quickly than the tolls 5 and at some point, call it t 22 , the poor agents view the travel times they would need to pay as equally painful as the tolls they face on the priced route and so start traveling on both routes. These poor agents will be able to arrive on-time, as there is enough capacity for them to do so. As the poor agents will not exhaust the available capacity, some rich agents will still be arriving on the priced route. The end of rush hour will be the mirror image of the start. There are no agents who are on the margin of arriving early or late who arrive on the free route between t 22 and t 2 2 (the time when poor agents stop arriving on the priced route). This means we cannot use Lemma 3 to determine what travels times are doing this interval. However, we do know the tolls schedule on the priced route and since we know the agents arriving during this interval are indifferent between arriving on-time on either route, we know
Differentiating both sides with respect to t gives us
The same reasoning will hold when rich agents are inframarginal, and gives us the following lemma.
5 Travel time is climbing at β 2 /α 2 , as a poor agent values travel time at α 2 this means that the cost of arriving on the free route is climbing at β 2 . However, the toll is only climbing at β 1 and we are only in this case with the poor inframarginal if β 2 > β 1 .
Lemma C.1. If agents from group g are indifferent between a free route and a priced route over an interval, then over that interval
This means that the travel time profile for the free route is defined by
On the tolled route the poor are inframarginal and so the equations that define the toll schedule are the same as in Section 4.4.2: (11)- (13) with A = 1 and B = 2. Equilibrium when the rich are inframarginal is basically the same, with the rich taking the place of the poor and the priced route taking the place of the free route. The toll schedule is defined by
Now it is the rich who are inframarginal, and they are inframarginal on the free route and so the equations that define the travel time profile are (3), (4), and (7) with A = 2 and B = 1. To write down the remaining equations let's return to the generic notation of groups A and B. We need to impose that some group B agents are actually indifferent between the two routes;
Finally, we require that the supply of arrival times equals the demand for arrival times for each group, early and late.
capacity used by B agents on route C
Solving this system of equations we can find equilibrium trip costs.
for the rest of family B,
for z ∈ {poor, rich} , and for the rest of group A trip costs are according to (C.19) . In order to be for this case to apply a number of conditions must hold. First, for group B to travel at the peak on both routes we need β B ≥ β A and β B /α B ≥ β A /α A . Second, for some group B agents to be inframarginal there must be enough total capacity for all group B agents to arrive on time, i.e., n B ≤ s (1 − λ toll ) + s * λ toll . Third, some agents from group B need to actually travel on route C at the peak, and so we need the isocost curve for group B agents at the peak on route C to be above the isocost for group A agents at the peak. If B = 1 this means
6 This needs to hold for all t ∈ [t BB , t B B ], but if it holds for one such t then due to the shape of the travel time profile or toll schedule it will hold for the others.
An alternative test for this third requirement, which is mathematically equivalent, is whether t BB ≤ t B B .
C.2.4. Both groups on both routes and all agents are marginal (2R, M). In this case group A arrives off-peak on both routes while group B arrives on-peak on both routes.
7 Because both groups travel on both routes, the travel time profile and toll schedule are defined by the same equations as in Section C.1.2: the travel time profile is defined by (C.2) and (C.3), while the toll schedule is defined by (C.9) and (C.10). Given these equations for the travel time profile and toll schedule, we need to solve for eight critical times t 0A , t A0 , t AB,free , t BA,free , t AB,toll , t BA,toll , t max A , t max B to fully specify the travel time profile and toll schedule and find equilibrium trip costs.
To solve for these eight critical times we will set up a system of eight linear equations. The first four will require that supply equals demand for both groups, for both early and late arrivals. Starting with group A agents who arrive early on either route,
Group B agents who are early use only some of the time before the peak either route,
We gain another equation by requiring that group B agents are indifferent between both routes. 8 We only need to require it for one group B agent, as the equations for the travel time profile and toll schedule will impose it for the rest. This gives us
For the final three equations we choose from the definitions of T max A and T max B and the requirement that T (t A0 ) = τ (t A0 ) = 0. 9 7 Recall that the same group will arrive off-peak on both routes, or at least be indifferent about doing so. 8 We have imposed this restriction for group A agents when we forced the start and end of rush hour to be the same on both routes. 9 The four equations are not linearly independent, but have rank 3.
Solving this system of equations gives us the equilibrium travel time profile and toll schedule, which we can use to find equilibrium trip costs. We know that an agent in group B with desired arrival time t max B will arrive at t max B and so can evaluate his trip cost at that point. Doing so yields
is a weighted average of the trip cost he would face were the road completely free,p M,free B, t max B , and completely priced,p M,toll B, t max B , but highway capacity set to the capacity he actually faces. Notice as λ toll approaches zero or one,
As always, the formula for the group A agent with desired arrival time of t max A is unchanged;
We can then define the trip cost for all other agents in reference to (C.29) and (C.30) using (C.19) with the appropriate updating of subscripts. The intuition and derivation of this is the same as in Section C.1.2.
In order to be for this case to apply a number of conditions must hold. First, for group B to travel at the peak on both routes we need β B ≥ β A and β B /α B ≥ β A /α A . Second, for all group B agents to be marginal there must not be enough total capacity for all group B agents to arrive on time, i.e., n B > s (1 − λ toll ) + s * λ toll . Third, some agents from group B need to actually travel on route C at the peak, and so we need the isocost curve for group B agents at the peak on route C to be above the isocost for group A agents at the peak. If B = 1 this means
An alternative test for this third requirement is whether t AB,C ≤ t BA,C , which is mathematically equivalent the the equations above.
C.2.5. Summary of when cases apply. In this subsection I summarize the results above for determining which case applies.
If the poor travel at the peak on on a free route but off-peak on a priced route, so that β 1 /α 1 ≤ β 2 /α 2 and β 1 > β 2 , then we can find which case applies using (C.31).
If β 1 /α 1 < β 2 /α 2 and β 1 < β 2 , so that the rich always travel off-peak, then A = 1. Similarly, if β 1 /α 1 ≥ β 2 /α 2 and β 1 ≥ β 2 , so that the poor always travel off-peak, then A = 2. In either of these situations we can find which case applies using (C.32). We can find which subcase applies by recalling that the last element of the subcase name, i.e., 1R, I, poor, is the name of the group which doesn't arrive off-peak. Definition. Let V x=x 0 be the set of parameters for which outcome Z occurs given that parameter x has value x 0 . If
Proposition D.1 (Pricing entire road). If there are two groups then pricing the entire road never hurts the rich and generates a Pareto improvement prior to spending the toll revenue if and only if
In particular,
• for any set of parameters there exists a throughput drop large enough such that pricing the entire road generates a Pareto improvement, and • if the rich are more inflexible than the poor then pricing the entire road generates a Pareto improvement.
Furthermore, pricing all of the lanes is more likely to generate a Pareto improvement as
• the ratio of inflexibility of rich to poor [( • income inequality (α 1 /α 2 ) decreases, or equivalently as β 1 /β 2 decreases, and • the fraction of agents who are rich [n 1 / (n 1 + n 2 )] decreases.
It is not a surprise to find that pricing the entire road never hurts the rich. This matches our intuition that both effects of pricing, changing the currency used to allocate arrival times and increasing throughput, help the rich.
For the poor, however, changing in the currency hurts while increasing throughput helps. The conditions of Proposition D.1 tell us when the poor are better off because the benefit from increasing throughput outweighs the harm from changing the currency.
It will be easier to understand the intuition of (D.1) if we first simplify it by replacing the right hand side with its maximum value, and then later add back in the nuance of the entire expression. Doing so allows us to say that pricing the entire road generates a Pareto improvement if
By simplifying (D.1) to (D.2) we can readily see two things. First, as the left-hand side of (D.2) is strictly positive we can always find a s/s * such that (D.2) holds. Thus it is always possible for the increase in capacity to be large enough for pricing all of the lanes generates a Pareto improvement, regardless of the other parameters.
Second, if the rich are more inflexible than the poor, so that the left-hand side of (D.2) is greater than one, then pricing all of the lanes yields a Pareto improvement. This holds even if there is no throughput drop at bottlenecks. This is because when the poor are less inflexible than the rich, the poor always arrive off-peak, regardless of whether the road is priced, and so pricing cannot displace them from the peak nor require them to outbid the rich in a currency that they hold more dear. When the poor are less inflexible than the rich we are in the top half of Figures 3a and 3b , and this is the example we considered above when there were humanities professors and lawyers.
When the poor are more inflexible than the rich then we are in the bottom half of Figures 3a and 3b , and it is less likely that pricing all of the lanes generates a Pareto improvement. It becomes more likely the more similar are the poor and rich groups' level of inflexibility, i.e., the closer the left-hand side of (D.2) is to one. This is because the more similar agents are in their willingness to pay with travel time to avoid schedule delay, the more alike the slope of the travel time profile at any point in time during rush hour, and so the less agents prefer their actual arrival time to any other during rush hour. Because agents only slightly prefer their actual arrival time, the harm to an agent of changing their arrival time to be further from the peak is small and so it is easier for the benefit from shrinking rush hour to outweigh this harm.
11
Returning to (D.1) we see that the right-hand side is reduced, and so it becomes easier to obtain a Pareto improvement, when β 1 /β 2 is less than one and small, and n 2 /n 1 is large, n 2 > s, and s * ≥ n 2 > s. Note that these effects only matter when the poor are more inflexible than the rich, so that they arrive at the peak when the road is free.
Lowering β 1 /β 2 reduces the damage pricing does to the poor. Notice that
and so when we lower β 1 /β 2 while holding fixed each groups inflexibility we are actually lowering α 1 /α 2 . In other words, we are reducing the degree of income inequality, and so reducing the difference in the two groups' exchange rates between travel time and money. Hence, pricing gives less of an advantage to the rich and so is more likely to lead to a Pareto improvement. The ratio β 1 /β 2 is inside of a min operator because if β 1 > β 2 then the rich are willing to pay more in money to reduce schedule delay than the poor and so the poor don't care how much more the rich are willing to pay, just that they are willing to do so. If, however, β 1 < β 2 , then the poor are affected by the actual amount the rich are willing to pay since they must pay more than that amount. When n 2 /n 1 is large there are not many rich agents relative to the number of poor agents, and so the presence of rich agents causes less harm. Should the rich displace the poor from the peak, the amount of displacement is small. If the rich don't displace the poor then the tolls the poor face are higher due to their presence, but when there are not many rich agents the tolls are not much higher.
It is easier to get a Pareto improvement when n 2 > s because it means that the poor were not getting the advantage of being inframarginal when the road was free. When an agent is inframarginal they are able to arrive at the time they want while paying a cost that reflects the preferences of those who don't value being on-time as much as they do. Should the poor be inframarginal when the road is free then pricing does them great harm by taking this advantage away from them and it becomes difficult for pricing to generate a Pareto improvement. Even if they are still inframarginal when the road is priced they are hurt because the difference between their own willingness to pay to avoid schedule delay and that of the rich shrunk when the currency changed.
When the poor are more inflexible than the rich the best case for being able to price all of the lanes is when s < n 2 < s * and β 2 > β 1 . In this case pricing helps the poor in an 11 Note that the harm from being displaced is an upper bound on how much pricing all of the lanes hurts the poor because the poor may prefer to respond to pricing by paying higher tolls and arriving at the peak over arriving off-peak. additional way, it allows them to become the inframarginal driver and thus pay a cost based on the preferences of those who don't value being on-time as much as they do. This additional benefit makes it more likely that the gains from pricing will outweigh the harm it does. Proposition D.2 (Pricing part of road). If there are two groups then pricing part of the road never hurts the rich and there exists a λ toll ∈ (0, 1) such that pricing λ toll of the road generates a Pareto improvement if one of the following is true:
In particular, pricing part of the road generates a Pareto improvement if
• the poor are inframarginal when the road is free, • the fraction of agents who are rich is large enough, or • it generates a Pareto improvement to price all of the lanes, with some exceptions when n 2 = s.
Furthermore, pricing part of the road is more likely to generate a Pareto improvement as
• the ratio of inflexibility of rich to poor [(β 1 /α 1 ) / (β 2 /α 2 )] increases, • the throughput drop (1 − s/s * ) increases, and • income inequality (α 1 /α 2 ) decreases, or equivalently as β 1 /β 2 decreases.
First, (D.5) says if pricing all of the lanes helps every single agent, then pricing almost all of the lanes will too, with some small exceptions when n 2 = s and β 1 < β 2 . This equation is the same as (D.1) except that all of the inequalities switched from being weak to strict and vice versa; the adjustments to the inequalities in the last term of (D.5) results from discontinuities in agents' trip costs when they change from being marginal to inframarginal or vice versa.
By only pricing a portion of the lanes we also open up the possibility of pricing when the fraction of agents who are rich is large. This contrasts with when pricing all of the lanes where we are more likely to obtain a Pareto improvement when the fraction who are rich is small. The new area that (D.4) allows us to price is in the bottom right area of Figure 3b .
The intuition for why value pricing can be Pareto improving when most agents are rich is as follows. When we price a portion of the road the road we increase the measure of arrival times the poor need on the free route. This hurts the poor. But we also reduce the length of rush hour, which directly helps the rich, reducing travel times at any point when the rich are traveling. Because the rich are better off, the poor don't need to pay as much in travel time to outbid them for the desirable arrival times. The first effect is proportional to the number of agents who are poor, while the second is proportional to the total number of agents. The greater the fraction of agents who are rich, the more likely the second effect dominates the first. Should that happen, both the rich and poor are better off and value pricing generates a Pareto improvement.
Finally and most importantly, if the poor are inframarginal when the road is free, then pricing part of the lanes will generate a Pareto improvement. As the earlier example with finance professors and cashiers showed, as long as we choose the fraction of the lanes to price such that the poor are still able to be inframarginal on the free route, then they will be able to pay in the currency they prefer (travel time) at prices lower than when the entire road was free to arrive on-time.
D.2. Exploring the trade-off between equity and efficiency.
This subsection documents the results used to explore the trade-off between equity and efficiency. In particular, in derives the ratio of the largest harm done when pricing all of the lanes to per capita toll revenue and the share of welfare gains sacrificed to obtain a Pareto improvement. It also contains an additional five versions of Proposition D.3. If there are two groups, then the ratio of the largest increase in private costs to per capita toll revenue depends on which of ten cases the parameter values fall in. These ten cases are as follows.
(1) Rich always travel off-peak (β 1 /α 1 ≤ β 2 /α 2 and β 1 ≤ β 2 ) (a) Poor are always inframarginal (n 2 ≤ s)
Poor are only inframarginal when the road is tolled (s < n 2 ≤ s * )
(2) Rich travel off-peak when the road is free, but at the peak when the road is priced (β 1 /α 1 ≤ β 2 /α 2 and β 1 > β 2 ) (a) There is always an inframarginal group (n 2 ≤ s and n 1 ≤ s * )
The poor are inframarginal when the road is free and no one is inframarginal when the road is priced (n 2 ≤ s and n 1 > s * )
(c) The rich are inframarginal when the road is priced and no one is infrmarginal when the road is free (n 2 > s and n 1 ≤ s * )
There is never an inframarginal group (n 2 > s and n 1 > s * )
(3) Rich always travel at the peak (β 1 /α 1 > β 2 /α 2 and β 1 > β 2 ). There are three subcases, but in each the poor are always weakly better off (strictly if s * > s), and so the ratio is always non-positive.
Note that going from (1b) to (1c), (2a) to (2b), or (2c) to (2d), increases toll revenue, and so increases the denominator. This change in cases increases toll revenue because it causes the group traveling at the peak to become marginal, and so tolls are strictly larger during the peak.
In addition, going from (1b) to (1c) increases the numerator since it also increases the toll the poor must pay at the peak. D.2.2. Share of welfare gains sacrificed to obtain a Pareto improvement. I solve for the share of welfare gains sacrificed to obtain a Pareto improvement numerically. I do so since I solve analytically for the equilibrium total social cost when pricing all of the lanes, none of the lanes, and a portion of the lanes. I do so by integrating private trip costs for both groups and subtracting total toll revenue. Total toll revenue is found by integrating the toll schedule and multiplying by the mass of agents using the tolled route per unit time (λs * ). The expressions for total social cost when value pricing are sometimes over half a page long, and so I do not write them here. They are documented in the companion Mathematica file. I then solve numerically for the largest fraction of the lanes we can price while generating a Pareto improvement.
Then, for any given set of parameter values, I can calculate the change in total social cost when pricing all of the lanes, and the change in total social cost when obtaining a Pareto improvement. From these, I can calculate the share of the potential social welfare gains sacrificed to obtain a Pareto improvement. I then confirm that the results only depend on Figure 4 with alternate values of β rich /β poor and n rich + n poor /s. In both figures, the middle left plot is that from Figure 4 . In Figure D .1 it is worth noting how there are discontinuous changes in the maximum harm done as the fraction of agents who are rich increases at the thresholds at which the poor become inframarginal. For the top row there are two discontinuouties because in this case the poor travel at the peak both when the road is free and when it is tolled, and the additional discontinuity occurs when parameters become such that the poor are inframarginal on a tolled road. As the top row shows, the poor are helped the most by tolling when parameters are such that when the road is free the poor are marginal, but when it is tolled the poor are inframarginal. In this case the poor benefit from (1) all being able to arrive exactly on-time and (2) now paying prices that reflect the preferences of those with a lower willingness to pay for desirable arrival times then themselves.
12
With the exception of adding in the strip in the top row where tolling all the lanes is very beneficial to the poor, all these figures are largely just shifted versions of what we saw in Figure 4 .
Likewise, in Figure D .2, especially the top row, there are discontinuous changes once the poor agents become inframarginal. As the fraction of agents who are rich increases, they first become inframarginal on the priced route, and then on the free route. In general the plots in Figure D. 2 is largely the same as in Figure 4 . Note in particular that the results do not depend on β rich /β poor once this ratio is greater than one.
13 This is also true in our parameterization of when it is possible for pricing to generate a Pareto improvement, as plotted in 3 and proved in Propositions D.1 and D.2.
12 Note that the units this willingess to pay is measured in changes when we add tolls. When the road is free it is measured by β/α, while when the road is tolled it is measured in β. Appendix E. Omitted proofs E.1. Additional notation used in omitted proofs. It will be helpful for many of the proofs below to introduce some additional notation. We can define an agent's indifference curve over arrival time, travel time, and tolls using (2). Since on a free route there will be no toll, we can define the indifference curve on a free route as
Similarly, since there is to congestion related travel time on a priced route, we can define the indifference curve on a priced route as
Further, define
I define group 1 as rich and group 2 as poor (i.e., α 1 > α 2 ).
E.2. Uniqueness.
Proposition E.1. Trip prices, travel times, and tolls are unique except when n i = (1 − λ toll ) s for δ i > δ j on a free route and n i = λ toll s * for β i > β j on a priced route..
Proof. When considering a route that is completely free, with n i = s for δ i > δ j , then there is a zero measure set of arrival times where all agents who are arriving at that time are arriving on time, and so Lemma 3 gives us a unique travel time profile, and then as in Section C we can set up a unique linear system of equations which defines equilibrium trip prices and travel times. When considering a road that is completely priced, with n i = s * for β i > β j , then there is a zero measure set of arrival times where all agents who are arriving at that time are arriving on time, and so Lemma 4 gives us a unique toll schedule, and then as in Section C we can set up a unique linear system of equations which defines equilibrium trip prices and tolls.
When pricing a portion of the lane, with n i = (1 − λ toll ) s for δ i > δ j on a free route and n i = λ toll s * for β i > β j on a priced route, we Lemmas 3, 4, and C.1 define a unique travel time profile and toll schedule, and then as in Section C we can set up a unique linear system of equations which defines equilibrium trip prices, travel times, and tolls. E.3. Single peak. Proposition E.2. Rush hour has a single peak as long as n i = s for i such that δ i > δ j .
Proof. The intuition is that were there multiple peaks then there will be an agent who arrives early or late who would prefer to arrive in the valley between the peaks to their actual arrival time. To see this visually, draw the indifference curve of the agent who desired arrival time is in the valley, and whose group is marginal at the peak of rush hour; they will prefer arriving in the valley to early or late.
Assume by way of contradiction that there is more than one peak on a free route. In an abuse of notation, label two consecutive peaks as t max 1 and t max 2 , with t max 1 < t max 2 . A peak must occur within the support of the distribution of desired arrival times, since for travel times to be increasing before a peak requires there to be agents arriving early before the peak, and for travel times to be decreasing after a peak requires there to be agents arriving late after the peak. Thus there must be agents who wish to arrive at or before the peak, but who actually arrive late, and agents who wish to arrive at or after the peak, but who actually arrive early.
Since the peaks are in the support and the support is a connected set, then the local mimima between peaks must also be in the support of the distribution of desired arrival times. Let t min be the local minimum that occurs between t max 1 and t max 2 . Define group C as the group that is marginal and travels at the peak of rush hour.
Lettingp (i, t * ) be the equilibrium trip price of an agent in group i with desired arrival time t * , t min being a local minimum in the travel time profile implies max T (t; C, t max 1 ,p (C, t max 1 )) ,T (t; C, t max 2 ,p (C, t max 2 )) ≥T t; C, t min ,p C, t min with equality only possible for t = t min . This means the only possible time for agents with desired arrival time t min in group C is at time t min . Because n A = s it is impossible for all agents with desired arrival time t min to arrive on-time. This is a contradiction. As a result, in equilibrium there cannot be multiple peaks. The proof for a priced route is follows the same steps but using β.
E.4. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. In an abuse of notation, let t ∈ [t, t * ] mean that if t < t * , t ∈ [t, t * ], and if
and similarly,
which holds with equality if t ≥ t ≥t * or t ≤ t ≤t * . Since β j /α j < β i /α i , (E.3) and (E.4) imply
This simply says group i agents face greater schedule delay costs, measured in travel time, for arriving at t rather than t , than do group j agents. If an agent from group i with desired arrival time t * arrives at t then
by (E.5) this implies
and so all agents in group j prefer to arrive at t rather than t ∈ (t, t * ] and thus will not arrive at t .
E.5. Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof.
t , free ∈ σ (i, t * ) and t = t * ⇒ t ∈ arg min t p (t, free) ⇒ dp dt t , free = 0
Similarly,
⇒ dp dt + (t * , free) ≤ 0 and dp
E.6. Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. This proof is the same as that for Lemma 1, but replacing β/α with β, and T with τ. In an abuse of notation, let t ∈ [t, t * ] mean that if t < t * , t ∈ [t, t * ], and if
which holds with equality if t ≥ t ≥t * or t ≤ t ≤t * . Since β j < β i , (E.6) and (E.7) imply
This simply says group i agents face greater schedule delay costs, measured in dollars, for arriving at t rather than t , than do group j agents. If an agent from group i with desired arrival time t * arrives at t then
by (E.8) this implies
E.7. Proof of Lemma 4.
t , toll ∈ σ (i, t * ) and t = t * ⇒ t ∈ arg min t p (t, toll) ⇒ dp dt t , toll = 0
⇒ dp dt + (t * , toll) ≤ 0 and dp
E.8. Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. For all agents the cost of arriving at the very start or end of rush hour is the same on both routes because at those times there is no toll or travel time, just schedule delay.
Thus if an agent is willing to arrive at the start (or end) of rush hour on one route, then they are willing to do so on the other.
E.9. Proof of Lemma 6.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that only the rich are on the free route, which means the poor must be on the priced route. This means there exists an arrival time t and a desired arrival time t * 2 in the support of n 2 and such thatτ 2 (t, t * 2 ) ≥ max t * 1 ∈supp(n 1 )τ1 (t, t * 1 ), where for simplicity we drop the dependence of the indifference curves on equilibrium trip costs. Since by assumption α 1 > α 2 it follows that α
for all groups i and desired arrival times t * this impliesT 2 (t, t * 2 ) > max t * 1 ∈supp(n 1 )T1 (t, t * 1 ) and so the poor agent can lower his trip cost by deviating and arriving at t on the free route. This violates equilibrium and thus is a contradiction.
The proof for the second claim follows similar logic. Assume to the contrary that only the poor travel on the priced route, which means the rich must be on the free route. This means there exists an arrival time t and a desired arrival time t * 1 and such that T 1 (t, t * 1 ) ≥ max t * 2 ∈supp(n 2 )T2 (t, t * 2 ), where for simplicity we drop the dependence of the indifference curves on equilibrium trip costs. Since by assumption α 1 > α 2 it follows that α 1T1 (t, t * 1 ) > max t * 2 ∈supp(n 2 ) α −1 2τ 2 (t, t * 2 ). However, since α iTi (t, t * ) =τ i (t, t * ) for all groups i and desired arrival times t * this implies τ 1 (t, t * 1 ) > max t * 2 ∈supp(n 2 )T2 (t, t * 2 ) and so the rich agent can lower his trip cost by deviating and arriving at t on the priced route. This violates equilibrium and thus is a contradiction.
E.10. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. The homogeneous agents who make up all of the mass are better off by Proposition 1. When the road is free the travel time at the peak of rush hour is
and when the road is tolled the toll at the peak of rush hour is
The single poor agent who must arrive on-time is only better off if
Since the poor agent must arrive on-time at the peak this requires
E.11. Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. If there are some rich agents traveling at the peak of rush hour when the road is free, than either the rich are more inflexible than the poor, or the poor are more inflexible than the rich and the poor are inframarginal. If the rich are more inflexible than the poor, than (β 1 /α 1 ) / (β 2 /α 2 ) ≥ 1 and so by Proposition D.1 pricing all of the road is a Pareto improvement. If the poor are inframarginal then n 2 < s and so by Proposition D.2 pricing part of the road is a Pareto improvement.
Note that when s * ≥ s the trip cost a poor agent faces when inframarginal on a completely free road, as given by (10), is always greater than or equal to the trip cost a poor agent faces when inframarginal on a free route, as given by (19), because pricing some of the lanes increases total capacity. Thus as long as pricing leaves us in the case where the poor are inframarginal on the free route, then pricing a portion of the lanes generates a Pareto improvement before using the revenue. This case applies when
As 1 − n 2 /s is the fraction of capacity at the peak rich are using when the road is free, value pricing will generate a Pareto improvement as long as we leave enough capacity for all poor agents to continue to arrive on-time using the free route, or equivalently, as long as we do not price a fraction of the lanes that is greater than the fraction of people arriving at the peak who are rich.
E.12. Proof of Proposition D.1.
Proof. To have a Pareto improvement we need everyone's trip cost on a priced route to be less than or equal to their trip cost on a free route, with the inequality strict for at least one agent. To find when this is true we will need to solve for the change in equilibrium trip cost as the result of tolling in all ten cases. First we will establish some general results, and then use them to find the result for all of the cases. For convenience, we define five constants. For i ∈ {A, B, 1, 2} let
We will generally suppress their dependence on t to avoid notational clutter. Further define 
Since we need (E.9) to hold for all t ∈ [t s , t e ] we can simplify it to Proof. The condition for type A agents to be no worse off is the same as in Claim E.1 and its derivation essentially identical. For type B to be no worse off we need for all t ∈[t s , t e ]; using (9) and (C.19) with (C.18) yieldsp
(E.10)
This implies that for t ∈ [t s , t e ]
As a result
and (E.10) simplifies to Proof. The condition for type A agents to be no worse off is the same as in Claim E.1. For type B we need for t ∈ [t s , t e ]; using (C.19) with (C.18) as well as with (C.17) yields
Claim E.4. If β 2 /α 2 ≥ β 1 /α 1 , β 2 ≤ β 1 , and n 2 ≤ s, then pricing the entire road is a Pareto improvement if and only if
Proof. The rich are always better off because when the road was free each rich agent was willing to either arrive at the start or end of rush hour. They can still choose to do so, and the toll and travel time they would pay if they did are still zero. They choose not to and so by revealed preference are better off. For the poor we need for all t ∈ [t s , t e ]; using (9) and (C.19) with (C.16) yields 
Substituting this into (E.12) reveals that pricing is a Pareto improvement when
Claim E.5. If β 2 /α 2 ≥ β 1 /α 1 , β 1 ≥ β 2 , and n 2 > s, then pricing the entire road is a Pareto improvement if and only if
Proof. The rich are always better off because when the road was free each rich agent was willing to either arrive at the start or end of rush hour. They can still choose to do so, and the toll and travel time they would pay if they did are still zero. They choose not to and so by revealed preference are better off. For the poor to be no worse off we need for all t ∈ [t s , t e ]; using (C.19) with (C.17) as well as with (C.16) yields
In a few remaining steps we can use these claims to complete the proof. First note that these five claims exhaust the parameter space. Then notice that the first equation in Claims E.1 through E.3 hold strictly when A = 2 and B = 1, so that pricing is a Pareto improvement if
Next observe that with A = 1 and B = 2 and s = s * , Claim E.2 does not apply and the conditions of Claims E.1 and E.3 cannot hold. Finally note that (D.1) nests the requirements of the equation above, Claims E.1 through E.3 with A = 1 and B = 2, as well as Claims E.4 and E.5. We now prove that the rich are never hurt by pricing all of the road, again using Claims E.1-E.5. For Claims E.1-E.3 the first equation after the "if and only if" must hold for group B to not be harmed and the second must hold for group A not to be harmed. For the rich these equations always hold. The first paragraph of the proofs of Claims E.4 and E.5 show that when parameters are such that those claims apply the rich are never hurt.
The comparative statics and other claims follow directly from (D.1).
E.13. Proof of Proposition D.2.
Claim E.6. The group that travels off-peak when the road is completely free is never hurt by value pricing.
Proof. In every case the equation for the equilibrium start and end of rush hour is
Note that the numerator in the final factor is one because we normalized the total mass of agents to one. If s = s * then the start and end of rush hour do not change as the fraction of road that is tolled changes, while if s < s * the rush hour starts later and ends earlier as we increase the fraction of the road that is tolled.
Recall that any agent arriving off-peak before the peak of rush hour is indifferent between his arrival time and arriving at the start of rush hour; likewise an agent arriving off-peak after the peak of rush hour is indifferent between arriving at his actual arrival time and the end of rush hour. After pricing the road any agent who had been arriving off-peak still has the choice of arriving at the old start or end of rush hour, facing no toll and having no additional travel time. Thus they have an option that makes them just as well off as they were before and so cannot be worse off.
Claim E.7. No rich agents are hurt when switching from Case I with B = 1 to Case 1R, I with B = 1.
Proof. The intuition for this result is as follows. Both when the road was free and when pricing some of the lanes, poor agents are the marginal driver at every arrival time during rush hour on the free route. Because the poor agents were arriving off-peak when the road was free we know by Claim E.6 that they are no worse off, which means travel times at any point in time cannot be worse. Any given rich agent could choose to continue arriving at the same time on the free route as he did when there were no priced lanes and would not be worse off. Thus, no rich agents can be worse off.
Mathematically it holds becausē
Claim E.8. No rich agents are hurt when switching from Case I with B = 1 to Case 1R, M with B = 1.
Proof. The intuition is the same as for Claim E.7. More formally, one of the conditions for Case 1R, M to apply isp 1R,M,rich (B,
Then combining (E.13) and (E.14) we can conclude that no rich agent sees their trip cost increase as a result of pricing a portion of the lanes.
Claim E.9. No rich agents are hurt when switching from Case I with B = 1 to Case 2R, I with B = 1.
Proof. The intuition is the same as for Claim E.7. More formally, for t * ∈ [t BB , t B B ]
The formal proof for t * ∈ [t B B , t e ] is very similar to the one for t * ∈ [t s , t BB ].
Note that it is not possible to go from Case I with B = 1 to Case 2R, M with B = 1, because if there was enough capacity for the rich to be inframarginal when the road was free there is enough capacity for the rich to be inframarginal if they are traveling at the peak on both routes. Proof. The intuition for the proof is that the rich agent's trip cost is higher in Case M than in Case I, and so if they are better off when switching from Case I then must be better off when switching from Case M.
If when the road is completely free only rich agents are arriving at the peak, then because agents who arrive at the peak are indifferent between when they actual arrive and arriving exactly on-time we know and so ifp z (B, t * ) ≤p I,free (B, t * ) thenp z (B, t * ) <p M,free (B, t * ) for any case z. This implies that Claims E.7 through E.9 also imply that no rich agent is hurt when switching from Case M with B = 1 to their respective cases.
Claim E.11. No rich agents are hurt when switching from Case M with B = 1 to Case 2R, M with B = 1.
Proof. Note thatp 2R,M (B, t max ) is the weighted average of the trip costs he would face were the road completely free or completely tolled, but with highway capacity set at the level he actually faces. Both of these costs are less thanp M,free (B, t max ), and so the weighed average of them is less thanp M,free (B, t max ). Thus the rich agent who desires to arrive at t max is not hurt, and since the adjustment to equilibrium trip costs for different desired arrival times is the same in Case M with B = 1 as it is in Case 2R, M with B = 1, this means that no rich agents are hurt when switching from Case M with B = 1 to Case 2R, M with B = 1.
Claim E.12. The rich are never hurt by pricing a portion of the lanes.
Proof. If the rich were arriving off-peak when the road was completely free, then we know they cannot be made worse off by Claim E.6, so we only need to concern ourselves with when they arrive on-peak when the road is free, i.e., β 1 /α 1 > β 2 /α 2 . If β 1 /α 1 > β 2 /α 2 then α 1 > α 2 , so the only relevant cases are those where B = 1 both when the road is free and when part of it is priced. Claims E.7 through E.11 show that in each of these cases the rich are not worse off.
The next part of the proof derives conditions for when the poor are not hurt by value pricing.
Claim E.13. No poor agents are hurt when switching from Case I with B = 2 to Case 1R, I with B = 2.
Proof. The intuition for this result is that we have increased highway capacity by pricing some of the lanes, but have not displaced any of the poor agents. Formally, > (s/s * ) (n 2 /n 1 ) (1 − s/s * ) + n 2 /n 1 .
Proof. The algebra for this proof is in the accompanying Mathematica file, but let's walk through the steps. First note that when λ toll = 0 and B = 2 thatp 1R,M,poor (B, t * ) = p M,free (B, t * ). Then I find when the first derivative ofp 1R,M,poor (B, t * ) with respect to λ, evaluated at λ = 0 is negative. This will tell us that when E.16 holds then pricing a small portion of the lanes helps the poor. Then I show that the second derivative of p 1R,M,poor (B, t * ) with respect to λ is positive, so that we can conclude that if the first derivative ofp 1R,M,poor (B, t * ) with respect to λ, evaluated at λ = 0 is not negative then this derivative is never negative and so the poor are always hurt when switching from Case M with B = 2 to Case 1R, M with B = 2.
Claim E.15. If (D.5) holds, then there exists a fraction of the road we can price where no road users are hurt.
Proof. The overview of the proof is that if in the limit as λ toll → 1 all agents are better off, then there exists a λ toll close to 1 such that all agents are better off. As trip costs are piecewise continuous, the only real issue is handling the discontinuities when a group goes from being marginal to inframarginal or vice versa. First note that within every case trip costs are rational functions with non-zero denominators, and so continuous.
Next note that lim λ→1pX,Y,Z (C, t * ) =p Y,toll (C, t * ) for X ∈ {1R, 2R} , Y ∈ {I, M} , Z ∈ {poor, rich} , C ∈ {A, B} , t * ∈ [t s , t e ], and {X, Z, C} = {1R, poor, B} . The proof of this is straightforward and so is omitted, but note that when both groups are on both routes ({X, Y} = {2R, I}) that the set of marginal agents in group B goes to zero in the limit.
It is not a problem that the limit doesn't hold when {X, Z, C} = {1R, poor, B} because these cases cannot apply when λ is close to 1. These cases cannot apply when λ is near 1 because these cases only occur when there are no poor agents on the priced route but for λ close enough to 1 the poor will want to travel on both routes. More precisely, for every positive s, s * , and n 2 there exists a λ toll < 1 such that no case where {X, Z, C} = {1R, poor, B} applies. This follows from the fact that were rush hour on the priced route to be shorter than rush hour on the free route then agents on the free route who had been traveling near the start or end of rush hour would start traveling on the priced route as they could arrive "outside" of rush hour on the priced route, and so pay no toll and have no excess travel time, while still arriving closer to their desired arrival time. Were there no poor agents on the priced route then rush hour on the priced route would be shorter than rush hour on the free route when n 1 (t e − t s ) / (λ toll s * ) < n 2 (t e − t s ) / [(1 − λ toll ) s] which occurs when λ toll > s · n 1 / (s · n 1 + s * · n 2 ). Since all the terms on the right hand side of this equation are positive, the right hand side is less than one, and we can find a λ < 1 such that no case with {X, Z, C} = {1R, poor, B} applies.
Notice that if some agents switch from being marginal to inframarginal at λ = 1 then the limit of their trip costs will not equal the value of trip costs at λ = 1. This means that the set of parameter values for which each case applies is a little different, specifically the inequalities defining which case applies switch from strict to weak and vice versa. That said, making this change in which case applies when we can use the work in the proof of (D.1) to find when in the limit as λ toll → 1 all agents are better off and use that to know when we can price almost all of the road and obtain a Pareto improvement.
We can bring all of the claims together to prove Proposition D.2. By Claim E.6 we know that the group who arrives off-peak when the road is free is never hurt, and by Claim E.12 we know the rich are never hurt. If n 2 < s then we know the poor cannot be hurt because either the poor had been arriving off-peak when the road was completely free or Claim E.14 applies. E.14. Proof of Proposition D.3.
Proof. First recall that the poor agent with desired arrival time t max is the worst off agent due to pricing.
Claim E.16 (Case 1a). If the rich always travel off-peak (β 1 /α 1 ≤ β 2 /α 2 and β 1 ≤ β 2 ) and the poor are always inframarginal (n 2 ≤ s), then the ratio of the largest welfare loss to (n 2 > s and n 1 ≤ s * ), then the ratio of the largest welfare loss to per capita toll revenue is 2 
